Abstract. We investigate the complexity of isomorphisms of computable structures on cones in the Turing degrees. We show that, on a cone, every structure has a strong degree of categoricity, and that degree of categoricity is 0 (α) for some α. To prove this, we extend Montalbán's η-system framework to deal with limit ordinals in a more general way. We also show that, for any fixed computable structure, there is an ordinal α and a cone in the Turing degrees such that the exact complexity of computing an isomorphism between the given structure and another copy B in the cone is a c.e. degree in ∆ 0 α (B). In each of our theorems the cone in question is clearly described in the beginning of the proof, so it is easy to see how the theorems can be viewed as general theorems with certain effectiveness conditions.
Introduction
In this paper, we will consider the complexity of computing isomorphisms between computable copies of a structure after relativizing to a cone. By relativizing to a cone, we are able to consider natural structures, that is, those structures which one might expect to encounter in normal mathematical practice. The main result of this paper is a complete classification of the natural degrees of categoricity: the degrees of categoricity of natural computable structures. Unless otherwise stated, all notation and conventions will be as in the book by Ash and Knight [AK00] . We consider countable structures over at most countable languages.
Recall that a computable structure is said to be computably categorical if any two computable copies of the structure are computably isomorphic. As an example, consider the rationals as a linear order; the standard back-and-forth argument shows that the rationals are computably categorical. It is easy to see, however, that not all computable structures are computably categorical. The natural numbers as a linear order is one example.
There has been much work in computable structure theory dedicated to characterizing computable categoricity for various classes of structures (e.g., a linear order is computably categorical if and only if it has at most finitely many successivities [GD80] , [Rem81] ). For those structures that are not computably categorical, what can we say about the isomorphisms between computable copies, or more generally, about the complexities of the isomorphisms relative to that of the structure?
We can extend the definition of computable categoricity as follows. It is easy to see, for example, that the natural numbers as a linear order, N , is 0 ′ -computably categorical. Indeed, it is also easy to construct a computable copy A of N such that every isomorphism between A and N computes 0 ′ . Thus 0 ′ is the least degree d such that N is d-computably categorical. This motivates the following definitions. Definition 1.2. We say a computable structure A has degree of categoricity d if
(1) A is d-computably categorical.
(2) If A is c-computably categorical, then c ≥ d. Definition 1.3. We say that a Turing degree d is a degree of categoricity if there exists a computable structure A with degree of categoricity d.
The notion of a degree of categoricity was first introduced by Fokina, Kalimullin and R. Miller [FKM10] . They showed that if d is d.c.e. (difference of c.e.) in and above 0 (n) , then d is a degree of categoricity. They also showed that 0 (ω) is a degree of categoricity. For the degrees c.e. in and above 0 (n) , they exhibited rigid structures capturing the degrees of categoricity. In fact, all their examples had the following, stronger property. Definition 1.4. A degree of categoricity d is a strong degree of categoricity if there is a structure A with computable copies A 0 and A 1 such that d is the degree of categoricity for A, and every isomorphism f ∶ A 0 → A 1 satisfies deg(f ) ≥ d.
In [CFS13] , Csima, Franklin and Shore showed that for every computable ordinal α, 0
is a strong degree of categoricity. They also showed that if α is a computable successor ordinal and d is d.c.e. in and above 0 (α) , then d is a strong degree of categoricity. In [FKM10] it was shown that all strong degrees of categoricity are hyperarithmetical, and in [CFS13] it was shown that all degrees of categoricity are hyperarithmetical. There are currently no examples of degrees of categoricity that are not strong degrees of categoricity. Indeed, we do not even have an example of a structure that has a degree of categoricity but not strongly.
All known degrees of categoricity satisfy 0 (α) ≤ d ≤ 0 (α+1) for some computable ordinal α. So in particular, all known non-computable degrees of categoricity are hyperimmune. In [ACar] , Anderson and Csima showed that no non-computable hyperimmunefree degree is a degree of categoricity. They also showed that there is a Σ 0 2 degree that is not a degree of categoricity, and that if G is 2-generic (relative to a perfect tree), then deg(G) is not a degree of categoricity. The question of whether there exist ∆ Turning to look at the question of degree of categoricity for a given structure, R. Miller showed that there exists a field that does not have a degree of categoricity [Mil09] , and Fokina, Frolov, and Kalimullin [FFKar] showed that there exists a rigid structure with no degree of categoricity.
In this paper, we claim that the only natural degrees of categoricity are those of the form 0 (α) for some computable ordinal α. By a natural degree of categoricity, we mean the degree of categoricity of a natural structure.
What do we mean by natural? A natural structure is one which might show up in the normal course of mathematics; a structure which has been constructed, say via diagonalization, to have some computability-theoretic property is not a natural structure. Of course, this is not a rigorous definition. Instead, we note that arguments involving natural structures tend to relativize, and so a natural structure will have property P if and only if it has property P on a cone (i.e., there is a Turing degree d such that for all c ≥ d, P holds relative to c). Thus by considering arbitrary structures on a cone, we can prove results about natural structures.
The second author previously considered degree spectra of relations on a cone [HT] . McCoy [McC02] has also shown that on a cone, every structure has computable dimension 1 or ω. Here, we give an analysis of degrees of categoricity along similar lines.
Our main theorem is:
Theorem 1.5. Let A be a countable structure. Then, on a cone: A has a strong degree of categoricity, and this degree of categoricity is 0 (α) .
There are three important parts to this theorem: first, that every natural structure has a degree of categoricity; second, that this degree of categoricity is a strong degree of categoricity; and third, that the degree of categoricity is of the particular form 0 (α) . The ordinal α is the least ordinal α such that A is 0 (α) -computably categorical on a cone. This is related to the Scott rank of A under an appropriate definition of Scott rank [Monb] : α is the least ordinal α such that A has a Σ inf α+2 Scott sentence if α is infinite (or a Σ α+3 Scott sentence if α is finite). While α may not be computable, every ordinal is computable on some cone.
The construction of a structure with degree of categoricity some d.c.e. (but not c.e.) degree uses a computable approximation to the d.c.e. degree; this requires the choice of a particular index for the approximation, and hence the argument that the resulting structure has degree of categoricity d.c.e. but not c.e. does not relativize. By our theorem, there is no possible construction which does relativize. Moreover, our theorem says something about what kinds of constructions would be required to solve the open problems about degrees of categoricity, for example whether there is a 3-c.e. but not d.c.e. degree of categoricity, or whether there is a degree of categoricity which is not a strong degree of categoricity-the proof must be by constructing a structure which is not natural, using a construction which does not relativize.
The proof of the Theorem 1.5 also gives an effectiveness condition which, if it holds of some computable structure, means that the conclusion of the theorem is true of that structure without relativizing to a cone. Indeed, each degree of the form 0 (α) is a degree of categoricity on a cone. To see this, examine the proof of Theorem 3.1 of [CFS13] showing that each 0 (α) is a degree of categoricity, and note that the proof relativizes.
In 2012, Csima, Kach, Kalimullin and Montalbán had an unpublished proof of Theorem 1.5 in the case where A is 0 ′ -computably categorical on a cone. That is, they showed that if A is 0 ′ -computably categorical on a cone, but not computably categorical on a cone, then A has strong degree of categoricity 0 ′ on a cone. They also conjectured the general result at that time.
The second result of this paper concerns the difficulty of computing isomorphisms between two given computable copies A and B of a structure. We show that, on a cone, there is an isomorphism of least degree between A and B, and that it is of c.e. degree. The degree d is the least degree of an isomorphism between A and B.
We begin in Section 2 by giving the technical definitions for what we mean by "on a cone." In Section 3 we prove 1.7. In Section 4 we prove a stronger version of Theorem 1.5 in the restricted case of structures which are 0 ′ -computably categorical on a cone; it will follow that the only possible degrees of categoricity on a cone for such structures are 0 and 0 ′ . In order to prove the general case of Theorem 1.5, we need to use the method of α-systems. These were introduced by Ash, see [AK00] . Montalbán [Mona] introduced η-systems, which are similar to Ash's α-systems but give more control. They also deal with limit ordinals in a different way. We need the extra control of Montalbán's η-systems, but we need to deal with limit ordinals as in Ash's α-systems. So in Section 5 we introduce a modified version of Montalbán's η-systems. We conclude in Section 6 with a complete proof of Theorem 1.5.
Relativizing to a Cone
A cone of Turing degrees is a set C d = {c ∶ c ≥ d}. Martin [Mar68] showed that under set-theoretic assumptions of determinacy, every set of Turing degrees either contains a cone or is disjoint from a cone. Noting that every countable intersection of cones contains a cone, we see that we can form a {0, 1}-valued measure on sets of degrees by assigning measure one to those sets which contain a cone. In this paper, all of the sets of degrees which we will consider arise from Borel sets, and by Borel determinacy [Mar75] , such sets either contain or are disjoint from a cone.
If P is a statement which relativizes to any degree, we say that P holds on a cone if there is a degree d (the base of the cone) such that for all c ≥ d, P holds relative to c. Thus a statement holds on a cone if and only if it holds almost everywhere relative to the Martin measure. In the rest of this section, we will relativize the definitions we are interested in. Note that even if α is not computable, there is a cone on which α is computable, and for c on this cone, ∆ 0 α (c) makes sense. In a similar way, we do not have to assume that the structure A is computable.
Recall that a computable structure A is relatively ∆ Definition 2.3. A Scott family for a structure A is a countable family Φ of formulas over a finite parameter such that
• for eachā ∈ A, there exists ϕ ∈ Φ such that A ⊧ ϕ(ā)
• if ϕ ∈ Φ, A ⊧ ϕ(ā), and A ⊧ ϕ(b), then there is an automorphism of A takingā tob.
It follows from work of Scott (see [AK00] ) that every countable structure has a Scott family consisting of Σ inf α formulas for some countable ordinal α. We now give the definitions needed to discuss degrees of categoricity on a cone. Definition 2.6. The structure A has degree of categoricity d relative to c if d can compute an isomorphism between any two c-computable copies of A, and moreover d ≥ c is the least degree with this property. If in addition to this there exist two c-computable copies of A such that for every isomorphism f between them, f ⊕ c ≥ T d, then we say A has strong degree of categoricity d relative to c. Definition 2.7. We say that a structure A has a (strong) degree of categoricity on a cone, if there is some d such that for every c ≥ d, A has a (strong) degree of categoricity relative to c. Definition 2.8. We say that a structure A has (strong) degree of categoricity 0 (α) on a cone, if there is some d such that for every c ≥ d, A has (strong) degree of categoricity c Further increasing c, we may assume that c can decide whether two formulas from S are satisfied by the same elements. Then we can replace S by a Scott family in which every tuple from A satisfies a unique formula from S. Finally, by replacing c with a higher degree, we may assume that c can compute, for an element of A, the unique formula of S which it satisfies, and can decide, for each tuple of the appropriate arity, whether or not it is a witness to the existential quantifier in that formula. This is the degree c from the statement of the theorem.
Let B be a copy of A. Consider the set
Let d be the degree of S(B) ⊕ B ⊕ c. First, note that the set
is c-computable. If f is an isomorphism between A and B, then f ⊕c computes S(A). Then using f and S(A), we can compute S(B). Thus
for every isomorphism f between A and B.
On the other hand, c computes S(A). Using S(B) and S(A) we can compute an isomorphism between A and B. So there is an isomorphism f between A and B such that
We now introduce a related set T (B). We will show that T (B) ⊕ B ⊕ c ≡ T d. If α is a successor ordinal, then T (B) will be Π 0 α−1 in B ⊕ c, and if α is a limit ordinal then T (B) will be ∆ 0 α in B ⊕ c. Thus d will be a degree of the appropriate type. We may consider the elements of B to be ordered, and hence order tuples from B via the lexicographic order. Let T (B) be the set of tuples (ā,b, ϕ) where:
(1) ϕ(x,ȳ) is a c-computable Π 0 β formula, for some β < α, (2) (∃ȳ)ϕ(x,ȳ) is in S, and (3) B ⊧ ϕ(ā,c), for somec ≤b in the lexicographical ordering of tuples from B. It is easy to see that if α is a successor ordinal, then T (B) is Π 0 α−1 in B ⊕ c, and if α is a limit ordinal then T (B) is ∆ 0 α in B ⊕c. Now we will argue that T (B)⊕B ⊕c ≡ T S(B)⊕B ⊕c. Suppose we want to check whether (ā,b, ϕ) ∈ T (B) using S(B) ⊕ B ⊕ c. Using c, we first compute whether (1) and (2) hold for ϕ. Then using S(B) ⊕ B ⊕ c we can compute an isomorphism f ∶ B → A. Now for eachc ≤b in B, B ⊧ ϕ(ā,c) if and only if A ⊧ ϕ(f (ā), f (c)). In A, using c we can decide whether A ⊧ ϕ(f (ā), f (c)).
On the other hand, to see whether (ā, (∃ȳ)ϕ(x,ȳ)) is in S(B) using T (B), look forb and ψ such that (ā,b, ψ) ∈ T (B). Some such ψ and witnessb must exist, sinceā satisfies some formula from S. Then (ā, (∃ȳ)ϕ(x,ȳ)) ∈ S(B) if and only if ϕ = ψ (recall that we assumed that each element of A satisfied a unique formula from the Scott family).
Not computably categorical on any cone
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.5 for structures which are 0 ′ -computably categorical on a cone. The general case of the theorem will require the η-systems developed in the next section, and will be significantly more complicated, so the proof of this simpler case should be helpful in following the proof in the general case, and in fact, we have a slightly stronger theorem in this case. We first recall some definitions from [AK00] . 
Definition 4.3 (p. 241 Ash-Knight). A structure A is α-friendly if for β < α, the standard back-and-forth relations ≤ β are c.e. uniformly in β.
There is a version of Theorem 2.4 for the non-relative notion of categoricity. The following result is the part of it that we will need. Proof. Suppose A is not computably categorical on any cone. Before we begin, note that since A is not computably categorical on any cone, for any tuplec in A, there exist a tuplē a in A that is 1-free overc. Let e be such that:
(
Once we put something into the diagram of B, we will not remove it, and so B will be d-computable. While the approximation f s will be d-computable, f will be C-computable.
We will have distinguished tuplesā 0 ∈ A andb 0 ∈ B, such that for any isomorphism g ∶ B → A, we will have 0 ∉ C if and only if g(b 0 ) is automorphic toā 0 in A. For n > 0 the strategy for coding whether n ∈ C will be the same, but ourā n andb n will be re-defined each time some m < n is enumerated into C. When n is enumerated into C, we will be able to redefine f onb n and on all greater values. At each stage s, we have current approximations a n [s] andb n [s] to these values. The tupleb n [s] will be a series of consecutive elements of ω; by B ↾↾b we mean the elements of B up to, and including, those ofb, and by B ↾b we mean those up to, but not including,b.
At each stage, if n ∉ C, for thoseā n andb n which are defined at that stage we will have f (b n ) is 1-free over f (B ↾b n ); otherwise, we will have 
If nothing enters C at stage s + 1, let n be least such thatā n [s] is undefined. For m < n, 
End of construction.
Sinceā n andb n are only re-defined when there is an enumeration of some m ≤ n into C, it is easy to see that for each n,ā n andb n eventually reach a limit. Moreover, since thē a n andb n form infinite sequences in A and B, respectively, and since f is not re-defined on B ↾↾b n unless there is an enumeration of m ≤ n into C, we see that f is an isomorphism between B and A. Moreover, C can compute a stage whenā n andb n have reached their limit, and hence f is c-computable. Now suppose g ∶ B → A is an isomorphism. To compute C from g ⊕ d, proceed as follows.
. Continuing in this way, givenb n andā n , we ask d whether (A, g(b n )) ≅ (A,ā n ), using the answer to decide whether n ∈ C and to computē b n+1 andā n+1 . Using Knight's theorem on the upwards closure of degree spectra [Kni86] , we get a slight strengthening of the above theorem. Proof. Take e as guaranteed by the theorem, and fix d ≥ e, and let c be c.e. in d. Let C be as guaranteed by the theorem. Since C is d-computable, by the proof of Knight's upward closure theorem [Kni86] (and noting that a "trivial" structure is computably categorical on a cone), there exists B such that deg(B) = d and such that there exists a d-computable isomorphism h ∶ B ≅ C. Now since A is computable and deg(B) = d, any isomorphism g ∶ A ≅ B computes d. Since d computes h, g computes the isomorphism g ○ h ∶ C ≅ A and hence it computes c. On the other hand, since c computes d and hence h, and since c computes an isomorphism between A and C, we have that c computes an isomorphism between A and B. 
A Version of Ash's Metatheorem
The goal of the remainder of the paper is to prove Theorem 1.5. Our main tool will be a version of Ash's metatheorem for priority constructions which was first introduced in [Ash86a, Ash86b, Ash90]. Ash and Knight's book [AK00] is a good reference. Montalbán [Mona] has recently developed a variant of Ash's metatheorem using computable approximations. Montalbán's formulation of the metatheorem also provides more control over the construction; for the proof of Theorem 1.5, we will require this extra control. However, Montalbán's version of the metatheorem, as written, only covers 0 (η) -priority constructions for η a successor ordinal. In this section, we will introduce the metatheorem and expand it to include the case of limit ordinals.
Fix a computable ordinal η for which we will define η-systems and the metatheorem for constructions guessing at a ∆ 0 η -complete function. Here our notation differs from Montalbán's but corresponds to Ash's original notation. What we call an η-system corresponds to what Ash would have called an η-system, but what Montalbán calls an η-system we will call an η + 1-system. This will allow us to consider, for limit ordinals η, what Montalbán might have called a < η-system. 5.1. Some ∆ 0 ξ -complete functions, their approximations, and true stages. Before defining an η-system and stating the metatheorem, we discuss some ∆ 0 ξ -complete functions and their approximations as introduced by Montalbán [Mona] . We will introduce orderings on ω to keep track of our beliefs on the correctness of the approximations.
For each computable ordinal ξ ≤ η, Montalbán defines a ∆ (N1) For every ξ, the sequence of stages t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < ⋯ for which ∇ ξ t is correct is an infinite sequence with ∇ η . Montalbán defines relations (≤ ξ ) ξ<η on ω, to be thought of as a relation on stages in an approximation. We will define relations (≤ ξ ) ξ<η which are almost, but not exactly, the same as Montalbán's (we leave the definition of these relations, and the proofs of their properties, to Lemma 5.1). An instance s ≤ ξ t of the relation should be interpreted as saying that, from the point of view of t, s is a ξ-true stage. A relation s ≤ ξ t is almost, but not exactly, equivalent to saying that for all γ ≤ ξ + 1, ∇ γ s ⊆ ∇ γ t . The problem is that we require the property (B4) below.
We also have a computable relation ⊴ on stages with s ⊴ t if and only if, for all ξ < η, ∇ ξ+1 s ⊆ ∇ ξ+1 t . We can interpret s ⊴ t as saying that s appears to be a true stage (or η-true stage) from stage t. This relation is computable by (N2) above.
We will see that the relations ≤ ξ satisfy the following properties: (B0) ≤ 0 is the standard ordering on ω.
(B1) The relations ≤ ξ are uniformly computable. (B2) Each ≤ ξ is a preordering (i.e., reflexive and transitive).
(B3) The sequence of relations is nested (i.e., if γ ≤ ξ and s ≤ ξ t, then s ≤ γ t).
(B4) The sequence of relations is continuous (i.e., if λ is a limit ordinal, then
t . (B6) The sequence t 0 < t 1 < . . . of true stages satisfies t 0 ⊴ t 1 ⊴ ⋯ and ⋃ i∈ω ∇ η t i = ∇ η . We call the sequence of true stages the true path. (B7) For s ∈ ω, we can compute H(s) = max{ξ < η ∇ ξ s = ⟨⟩}. H(s) has the property that if t > s and s ⋬ t, then s ≰ H(s) t. We call H(s) the height of s. (B8) For every ξ with ξ < η, and r < s < t, if r ≤ ξ t and s ≤ ξ t, then r ≤ ξ s. Moreover, if ξ is a successor ordinal, then it suffices to assume that s ≤ ξ−1 t. We will define, for convenience, the relations ⊴ ξ for ξ < η. Let s ⊴ ξ t if for all γ ≤ ξ + 1, ∇ Proof. The proof of this Lemma is very similar to the proof of Lemma 7.8 of [Mona] . The definition of our relations ≤ ξ is the same as Montalbán's, except for one small change. Let C be the set of tuples (λ, u, v) where λ is a limit ordinal, ∇ The only difference between our definition and Montalbán's is that we require λ < η.
The proof that (≤ ξ ) ξ<η satisfies (B0)-(B5) is the same as the proof of Lemma 7.8 of [Mona] . (B6) follows from (N1) and the fact that if r < t are both true stages, then r ⊴ s. 1 . The proof of (B6) in Lemma 7.8 of [Mona] also suffices to prove (B9). (B10) is immediate from the definitions if η is a successor, and follows from Lemma 7.6 in [Mona] if η is limit.
5.2. η-systems and the metatheorem. We are now ready to define an η-system. The definition is essentially the same as for Montalbán, except that what Montalbán would have called an η-system, we call an η + 1-system.
1 Montalbán uses, in the proof of (♣), Observation 2.1 for the relations (⊴ ξ ) ξ<η . The given proof of Observation 2.1 requires continuity (B4), which (⊴ ξ ) ξ<η does not have. However, it is easy to see that the proof of Lemma 7.7 suffices to prove Observation 2.1 for these relations.
(1) L is a c.e. subset of ω called the set of states.
(2) P is a c.e. subset of L <ω called the action tree.
is a finite or infinite sequence π = (ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 , . . .) which is in P if it is a finite sequence, or is a path through P if it is an infinite sequence, such that for all s, t < π and ξ < η,
If π is a 0-run, let E(π) = ⋃ s< π E(ℓ i ).
Given an infinite 0-run ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 , . . . of an η-system (L, P, (≤ L ξ ) ξ<η , E), let t 0 ⊴ t 1 ⊴ t 2 ⊴ ⋯ be the true stages. Then by the properties of E above, E(π) = ⋃ i∈ω E(ℓ t i ). So E(π) is c.e., but it is determined by the true stages.
Montalbán defines an extendability condition and a weak extendability condition. For our extendability condition, we weaken Montalbán's extendability condition even further (as well as modifying it slightly to allow limit ordinals). In order to define our extendability condition, we need the following definition.
Definition 5.4. To any stage s > 0, we effectively associate a sequence of stages and ordinals as follows.
Choose t * < s greatest such that t * ⊴ s. Some such t * exists as 0 ⊴ s. Now for each ξ < η 0 , let t ξ < s be the largest such that t ξ ≤ ξ s. Note that t * ≤ t ξ for each ξ as by (B9) t * ≤ ξ s. There may be infinitely many ξ < η, but there are only finitely many possible values of t ξ since they are bounded by s. Since the ≤ ξ are nested (B3), if γ ≤ ξ < η, then t ξ ≤ t γ . Now we will effectively define stages t * = s k < ⋯ < s 0 = s − 1 so that {s 0 , . . . , s k } = {t ξ ∶ ξ < η} as sets. Let s 0 = t 0 = s − 1. Suppose that we have defined s i . If s i ⊴ s, then k = i and we are done. Otherwise, let ξ i < η be the greatest such that s i = t ξ i . By definition of s i , it is of the form t ξ for some ξ. We can find the greatest such by computably searching for ξ i such that s i ≤ ξ i s but s i ≤ ξ i +1 s; some such ξ i exists since the relations are continuous and nested. Let
Definition 5.5. We say that an η-system (L, P, (≤ L ξ ) ξ≤η , E) satisfies the extendability condition if: whenever we have a finite 0-run π = ⟨ℓ 0 , ..., ℓ s−1 ⟩ such that for all i < k, ℓ s i+1 ≤ L ξ i +1 ℓ s i , where s k < s k−1 < ... < s 0 = s − 1 and ξ 0 < ξ 1 < ... < ξ k−1 < η are the associated sequences of stages and ordinals to s as in Definition 5.4, then there exists an ℓ ∈ L such that π̂ℓ ∈ P , ℓ s k ⊴ L ℓ, and for all
Now we are ready for the metatheorem. Proof of Theorem 5.6. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [Mona] . By the trivial case of the extendability condition, there is ℓ 0 ∈ L with ⟨ℓ 0 ⟩ ∈ P . Now suppose that we have a 0-run π = ⟨ℓ 0 , . . . , ℓ s−1 ⟩. We want to define ℓ s ∈ L such that π̂ℓ s ∈ P , and such that for every
Let {t ξ ξ < η}, s k < . . . s 0 = s − 1, and ξ 1 < . . . < ξ k be as in Definition 5.4. If t ≤ ξ s, then t ≤ t ξ , and by (B8), t ≤ ξ t ξ , so since π is a 0-run ℓ t ≤ L ξ ℓ t ξ . So it is sufficient to find ℓ with π̂ℓ ∈ P such that, for ξ < η, ℓ t ξ ≤ L ξ ℓ. That is, we must find an ℓ with π̂ℓ ∈ P , ℓ s k ⊴ L ℓ and
By the extendability condition, there is ℓ ∈ L with p̂ℓ ∈ P , ℓ s k ⊴ L ℓ, and
We can find such an l effectively, since we have described how to compute the s i and since the relations ≤ L ξ and ⊴ L are computable.
6. Proof of Theorem 1.5
In this section, we will give the proof of Theorem 1.5. To begin, we prove the following lemma which we will use for coding.
Lemma 6.1. Letx be a tuple. Let α 1 > β 1 , . . . , α n > β n be computable ordinals with β 1 ≥ β 2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ β n . Letū 1 , . . . ,ū n andv 1 , . . . ,v n be tuples such that ū i+1 = ū i + v i and such thatv i is α i -free overū i . Then there is a tupleȳ such that, for each i = 1, . . . , n,
Proof. We will inductively define tuplesx 0 , . . . ,x n , so that takingȳ =x n satisfies the lemma. Begin withx 0 =x, sox 0 satisfies (1) and (2). Givenx m satisfying (1) and (2) for all i, and (3) for i = 1, . . . , m, definex m+1 as follows. Ifx m already satisfies (3) for i = m + 1, setx m+1 =x m . Otherwise,
satisfies (1) and satisfies (2) and (3) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Sincex m ≤ β m+1x m+1 , and for i ≥ m + 1,
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem, Theorem 1.5. The proof will use the η-systems as developed in the previous section, together with a strategy similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4.6. Theorem 1.5 will follow easily from the following technical result. Proof. Suppose A is not ∆ 0 β categorical on any cone for any β < η. Let e be such that:
(1) A is e-computable, and e computes a Scott family for A in which each tuple satisfies a unique formula and also computes, for tuples in A, which formula in the Scott family they satisfy, (2) A is η + 1-friendly relative to e, (3) given a tupleā and β < η, e can decide whether a tupleb is β-free overā. (Such a tuple is guaranteed to exist by Corollary 4.5 since A is not ∆ 0 β -categorical on any cone.) Fix d ≥ e and D ∈ d. Our argument involves a D-computable η-system. To ease notation, we make no further mention of D (e.g., whenever we write ∇ β we really mean ∇ β (D)). We will define our η-system. Let B be a computable set of constant symbols not occurring in A. Let L be the set of sequences
dom(p) and ran(p) include the first r elements of B and A respectively, (L5)b n is α-free overā n , where α = max m≤n H(m) (see (B7)). Note that (L1)-(L4) are clearly computable, and that (L5) is e-computable by property (3) of e.
If ℓ has first coordinate p, and ℓ ′ has first coordinate p ′ , then for ξ < η, we set ℓ ≤ Let P consist of the sequences ℓ 0 , . . . , ℓ r such that
P3) if m ⊴ n, ℓ m has first coordinate p m , and ℓ n has first coordinate p n , then p m ⊆ p n . Note that (P1) and (P3) are computable, and that (P2) is e-computable by property (1) of e. Given ℓ n = ⟨p; (ā 0 ,b 0 ), (ā 1 ,b 1 ), . . . , (ā n ,b n )⟩, let E(ℓ) be the partial atomic diagram on B obtained by the pullback along p (using only the first p logical symbols).
Note that E(ℓ) is computable, and if ℓ 0 ≤ L 0 ℓ 1 with first coordinates p 0 and p 1 , respectively, then
has the extendability condition. Proof. Suppose we have a finite 0-run π = ⟨ℓ 0 , ..., ℓ s−1 ⟩, and let s k < s k−1 < ... < s 0 = s − 1, and ξ 0 < ξ 1 < ... < ξ k−1 < η be the associated sequences of stages and ordinals to s, as in Definition 5.4. Suppose that for each i, the first coordinate of ℓ s i is q s i .
Claim. There exists
Proof. We construct p inductively as follows. We let q * s 0 = q s 0 , and for 0 ≤ i < k, let q * s i+1 ⊇ q s i+1 be such that q * s i ≤ ξ i q * s i+1 . This is possible since q s i+1 ≤ ξ i +1 q s i and since q *
Claim. There exists
Proof. Let p ⊃ q s k be as in the previous claim. We will use Lemma 6.1. Letx = ran(p) and n = s 0 − s k . For i = 1, . . . , n, letū i =ā s k +i andv i =b s k +i . For i = 1, . . . , n, let α i = max 1≤j≤s k +i H(j) and let β i = ξ j where j is such that s j+1 < i ≤ s j . Note that by (L5), v i is α i -free overū i and that
Letȳ be the tuple we get by applying Lemma 6.1 and let p * map the domain of p toȳ. Then
Letā s = ran(p * ), and letb s be α-free overā s where α = max t≤s H(t), and such that a sbs contains the first s-many elements of A. Letc be a new set of constants in B and let p * * = p * ∪ {c ↦b s }. Let Proof. Using f we will compute the true path i 1 ⊴ i 2 ⊴ . . .. Then we can compute ∇ η = ⋃ n∈ω ∇ η in . We claim that ℓ j is a true stage if and only if ( * ) ran(f ↾ ā j + b j ) ≅ā jbj . Note that ( * ) is computable in f , and so this will complete the proof.
If j is a true stage, then p j extends to an isomorphism B → A. Since f is also an isomorphism, there is an automorphism of A taking ran(f ↾ dom(p j ) ), as an ordered tuple, to ran(p j ). By (P2), we have ran(p j ↾ ā j + b j ) ≅ā jbj and so we have ( * ).
If j satisfies ( * ), then we claim that j is a true stage. Suppose not, and let p = ⋃ n∈ω p in be the isomorphism B → A along the true path. Let i n be such that j < i n . Then by (B10), j ⋬ i n , and so ran(p in ↾ ā j + b j ) ≇ā jbj . Since p in ⊆ p and f is also an isomorphism B → A, we have ran(f ↾ ā j + b j ) ≅ ran(p in ↾ ā j + b j ) ≇ā jbj .
This contradicts ( * ). So j is a true stage.
Lemma 6.5. There is an isomorphism f ∶ B → A with ∆ 0 η ≥ T f .
Proof. Using ∆ 0 η we can compute the true path i 1 ⊴ i 2 ⊴ ⋯. Then along this path we compute an isomorphism f = ⋃ n p in from B → A.
This completes the proof.
We can improve the statement of the theorem slightly as follows using Knight's theorem on the upwards closure of degree spectra. It is now simple to extract Theorem 1.5 from the above result.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. Let A be a computable structure. By Remark 2.5, there is an ordinal α such that A is ∆ 0 α categorical on a cone. Let α ≥ 1 be the least such. By Corollary 6.6, there is a cone such that for every d in the cone, there exists a d-computable copy B of A such that every isomorphism between A and B computes ∆ 0 α (d). Thus A has strong degree of categoricity 0 (α) on this cone (0 (α−1) if α is finite).
